Denver Law Review
Volume 43

Issue 4

Article 2

January 1966

The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on
World Order - Part I
Ved P. Nanda

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Ved P. Nanda, The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order - Part I, 43
Denv. L.J. 439 (1966).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

THE UNITED STATES' ACTION IN THE
1965 DoMINIcAN CRISIS:
IMPACT ON WORLD ORDER -PART
By VED P.

I'

NANDA*

Beginning with the premise that collective use of coercion is
more desirable than individual use of force, Professor Nanda
analyzes and evaluates the United States' action in the Dominican
Republic. The United States' justification for its action is presented,
studied and placed in the context of the O.A.S. and U.N. Charters.
Asserting that the validity of a state's claim to use coercive measures
depends upon necessity and proportionality, Professor Nanda
measures the United States' action in light of these standards.Noting
that any attempt to test the validity of a state's action hinges upon the
observer's perception of facts, Professor Nanda concludes that the
United States' action fell short of meeting the standard of proportionality. He recommends that regional and internationalfactfinding bodies be established for a factual determination of an
internal conflict situation. Furthermore, he recommends that international or regional tribunals should review the initial use of force
by a state on the basis of first-hand information provided by these
bodies. Legal adjudication of a state's right may thus supplant the
political rationalizations.
INTRODUCTION

T

HE Dominican Republic has had the unenviable distinction of
changing government no less than eight times during the four-year
period following Trujillo's assassination on May 30, 1961. 2 The latest
crisis, initially an internal conflict, began on April 24, 1965.' Visible
external participation started with the landing of the United States
Marines in Santo Domingo on April 28.' Soon thereafter the Organ*Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Denver.
1 This is part 1 of a series of two articles, the second part to be published in Vol. 44, No. 2
of the Denver Law Journal.The writer is painfully aware of the conflicting reports on
what constitutes the "facts" of the Dominican crisis. He finds the proximity of events
coupled with each commentator's subjectivities coloring most of the writing in this area.
Consequently, analysis of the events is likely to suffer from lack of reliable source material. Discussion in this paper is however, based on the best data presently available.
For a historical background, see PERKINS, THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
(1961) ; PERKINS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN (1947) ; RODMAN, QuIsQUEYA: A HISTORY OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1964); SCHOENRICH, SANTO
DOMINGO: A COUNTRY WITH A FUTURE (1918); WELLES, NABOTH'S VINEYARDS:

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1844-1924 (1928)
BEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS (1956).

(two volumes); WILGUS, THE CARIB-

2 N.Y. Times, April 26, 1965, p. 1, col. 8. See also Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-14
(1965). For a recent biography of Trujillo, see CRASSWELLER, TRUJILLO -

THE LIFE

AND TIMES OF A CARIBBEAN DICTATOR (1966).

3 N.Y. Times, April 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 3. For a summary report see Dennis, Dominican
Dilemma, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 263, 268 (April 13, 1966).
4 For the President's statements on the dispatching of the United States Marines to the
Dominican Republic, see 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 738 (1965).
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ization of American States dispatched a special committee to the Dominican Republic,5 followed by a special representative of the United
Nations Secretary General who arrived on the scene on May 18.6 The
bulk of the United States troops formed the core of an Inter-American
Peace Force whose "sole purpose" was that of cooperating in the
restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic.'
The OAS Committee succeeded in getting the military Junta and
the rebels to agree to a cease-fire on May 5,8 but a week later, on
May 13, armed hostilities started again." Mainly through the good
offices of the United Nations and the Organization of American
States another cease-fire was arranged on May 2 1," and a provisional
government was set up on September 3, 1965." General elections in
the Dominican Republic were held in June 1966, resulting in the
victory of the Reformist candidate, Joaquin Balaguer, for the presidency.12 A gradual withdrawal of the Inter-American forces started
in July 1966.13 It is still not clear, however, whether another era in
5 As per Resolution adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on May 1, 1965. The vote was 19-0-1. For the text of the Resolution see
note 4 supra at 741; U.N. Doc. No. S/6319 (1965). The primary objective of the
Committee was to offer its good offices to obtain, urgently, a cease-fire.
6 For the Secretary-General's reports on his representative, Mayobre's arrival in Santo
Domingo, see U.N. Doc. No. S/6369 (1965); U.N. Doc. No. S/6365 (1965). For
the Secretary-General's report of the appointment of Jos6 A. Mayobre as his special representative, see U.N. Doc. No. S/ 6358 (1965). See S/Res/203 (1965) for the SecurityCouncil Resolution of May 14, 1965, inviting "the Secretary-General to send, as an
urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on the present situation."
7 As contained in the operative Paragraph 2 of the Resolution adopted by the Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on May 6, 1965. The voting
was 15 to 5 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay) with Venezuela abstaining.
The text of the resolution is contained in 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 862-63 (1965). For
the OAS Secretary-General's speech after the signing of the Constituent Act, InterAmerican Armed Forces, at Santo Domingo on May 23, 1965, see U.N. Doc. No.
S/6381, 3 (1965).
8 For the text of the Act of Santo Domingo, see OAS Official Records OEA/Ser. F/11.
10 Doc. 38 REV., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 868 (1965). See also KURZMAN, REVOLT OF
THE DAMNED 187-89 (1965); SZULc, DOMINICAN DIARY 137-41 (1965). It should
be noted that from the very beginning of this strife the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in
Santo Domingo, the Vatican representative, the Papal Nuncio, played a leading role in
making efforts for the cease-fire.
9
SZULC, DOMINICAN DIARY 207 (1965). See also KURZMAN, REVOLT OF THE DAMNED
253-79 (1965). SZULC, op. cit. supra at 207-68, gives an -on-the-spot" account of the
happenings between May 13 and May 21 when the "humanitarian" truce went into
effect.
10 For a summary report, see 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 9-10 (No. 6, 1965).
11See U.N. Doc. No. S/6676 (1965) for the OAS reports to the UN Secretary-General
on the accession of power of Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy to the presidency of the provisional government. The document also contains Garcia Godoy's speech on that occasion
on September 3, 1965.
12
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1966, p. 1, col. 7.
13 id., June 29, 1966, p. 16, col. !, contains a report about the sailing from the Dominican
Republic of a United States artillery battalion on June 28. These were the "first troops
to leave the Dominican Republic in the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force."
See also on the pull-out of the troops, editorials, id., June 27, 1966, p. 34, cols. 3-4; id.,
June 6, 1966, p. 40, cols. 1-4. The last units of the Inter-American Peace Force left the
Dominican Republic on September 21, 1966. See id. Sept. 28, 1966, p. 3, col. 1.
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the turbulent history of the Dominican Republic has finally come to
an end or whether a revolution has been temporarily interrupted."
Perhaps to a layman the Dominican internal strife poses simple
issues. The critics of the United States action in dispatching Marines
to the Dominican Republic have conveniently characterized this action
as a revival of the much resented "big stick policy" and "gunboat
diplomacy,"' S beginning of the so-called "Johnson doctrine,. 18 "illegal unilateral intervention,"" "military invasion,"" "direct aggression,"'" "flagrant violation of the United Nations and OAS Char14 See, e.g., Lens, The Unfinished Revolution, The Nation, May 2, 1966, p. 520. Id. at 523,
Lens poses the dilemma of the Dominican people in the words of Juan Bosch: "You
can't build democracy in this hemisphere with the United States and you can't build it
without the United States." Lens explains the dilemma thus:
You can't build it with the United States because Uncle Sam insists, as the
cornerstone of its policy, on upholstering flabby military Fascists. And you
can't build it without, because the U.S. represents the economic and political
reality of this hemisphere. Without U.S. tolerance it is impossible to forge a
violable [sic] society.
The Dominican people are caught on the horns of this dilemma, and it is
doubtful that the June elections ... will spring them loose.
Id., May 2, 1966, p. 523. See also Draper, "The New Dominican Crisis," The New
Leader, Jan. 31, 1966, 3 at 8.
15 "Sensitivity to Latin American concern over a seeming revival of 'gunboat diplomacy'
prompted the Washington administration to propose ... that the O.A.S. create an InterAmerican Peace Force to assume charge of the Dominican situation." DENNIS, Op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 270-71. KURZMAN, SANTO DOMINGO: REVOLT OF THE DAMNED 297

(1965). See, however, the reply to the charge of "gunboat diplomacy," entitled "Interfor Freedom," N.Y. Herald Tribune, May 2, 1965, which the editorial said was
vening
"as
unjustified in this instance as the gunboats of old are obsolete." The editorial pointed
out that the purpose and the context of "intervention" justified the United States action,
notwithstanding the editorial's finding that "the protection of United States and other
foreign lives seems to have been more an excuse than a reason - a device designed to
give juridical legitimacy to a move made for reasons of high policy." The Soviet representative charged in the Security Council that the United States action was a 'throw-back
to gunboat diplomacy," 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 12 (No. 8, 1965). Cf. Meeker's statement on the subject, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 60, 61 (1965). See also Fleming, Can FAx
AMERICANA Succeed?, 360 THE ANNALS 127, 134-35 (1965).
16 The representative of Uruguay at the United Nations said that like the Monroe Doctrine
and the Roosevelt Corollary, the "Johnson doctrine was only a political statement which
...was neither a juridical statement nor an American doctrine in the original and correct meaning of the word." 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 6 (No. 6, 1965). See also James
Reston's column, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1965, p. 46, cols. 4-8, wherein he says that if the
Johnson doctrine, that is, unilateral military action, were carried out, it "could require
more Marines than the President has under his command." See also Matthews, Santo
Domingo and 'Nonintervention, id., May 10, 1965, p. 32, cols. 4-8, wherein he observes that the " 'Johnson doctrine'-that the United States will intervene automatically
against the threat of a Communist take-over in any Latin-American country - involves
a basic conflict with [the] nonintervention principle." Chew, A New Latin American
Policy - How Communists Were Thwarted in the Dominican Republic, The National
Observer, May 17, 1965, quoted a U.S. official in Santo Domingo as saying: "With his
move into the Dominican Republic President Johnson has adopted a new policy for
Latin America ... a Johnson doctrine. . . . He has put the Communists on clear notice
that we have at last drawn a line." See also N. Y. Times, May 6, 1965, p. 38. cols. 1-2,
entitled The Illusion of Omnipotence.
17 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 23365, 23369 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965) (speech by Senator
Clark).
18 From the Cuban representative's remarks in the Security Council, 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 5 (No. 6, 1965).
19This is how the Soviet news agency Tass characterized the United States action. See
U.N. Doc. No. S/6317 (1965).
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ters,"' etc. Supporters of the United States' action are equally vocal
in applauding it as an appropriate and timely action that protected
the lives of the American citizens and of other foreign nationals,"
prevented the spread of "a major civil war,"' 2 and thwarted the Communist conspiracy to take over the Dominican Republic and transform
it into "another Cuba."' Thus it provided the Dominican people "another chance to let their wills be known at the ballot box." 2' The
supporters can easily vindicate their claims by pointing to the relative
calm in the June 1966 Dominican elections, and to the results of
these elections. 5
For a student of international law, however, who looks at the
Dominican scene from the standpoint of an independent observer interested in a better world order, 8 the happenings in the Dominican
Republic provide a combination of intriguing questions of law and
policy. The purpose of this paper is to identify some of these problems and to inquire into their impact on the international legal order.
20 From the U.S.S.R. representative, Nikolai Fedorenko's remarks in the Security Council,

2 UN Monthly Chronicle 4 '(No. 6, 1965).
21 See, e.g., Ambassador Bennett's speech in Atlanta in which he attributed to the prompt

action on the part of the United States the "important result" that "no American civilians lost their lives ... [and] close to 5,000 persons from 46 countries were evacuated
safely from the country." 111 CONG. REc. 23669 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1965).
22 Ibid.
2 See, e.g., Representative Selden's speech, 111 CONG. REc. 24073, 24076 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1965). Representative Rogers of Florida left no doubt as to what he perceived
the outcome of the United States action was, when he remarked in the House that "had
the United States acted as swiftly in Cuba as was done in the Dominican Republic Castro
and communism would not be in Havana today. It is also clear that we must pursue a
firm policy in the Dominican Republic to curb Castroism in the Caribbean." Id. at
13468 (daily ed. June 17, 1965). See id. at 8838 (May 3, 1965) for Representative Andrews' remarks that the President's "expressed determination to prevent the establishment of another Communist regime in this hemisphere [as indicated by U.S. action) is
the most encouraging announcement in America's foreign policy since 1961." See also
remarks by Representatives Whitener and Dorn, id. at 8809, and by Senators Lausche
and Long, id. at 9000-1, 9038, respectively (daily ed. May 4, 1965).
24 111 CONG. Rac. 24076 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
25 See Montgomery, The Dominican People Voted in an Atmosphere of Tranquility Today, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1966, p. 1, col. 3. Id., June 3, 1966, p. 13, col. 4: "Orderly
vote pleases Johnson."; Id., June 3, 1966, p. 38, col. 1: "Victory of Balaguer ....
(editorial). This editorial praised the orderliness of the Dominican elections and suggested that Balaguer had won because the people were weary of violence and thought he
offered the best hope for peace.
26 A "better world order" in the context of this paper means a world in which unilateral
coercion across state lines gives way to collective action undertaken only by international organizations. It is both desirable and useful to make every effort to clarify issues
in a given conflict that might have a significant bearing on the international scene. It is
similarly helpful to discuss ways and means to refine and strengthen the regional
and international machinery for handling such conflicts. Obviously there are at present
serious limitations on effective regulation and control of unauthorized coercion by international decision-makers. These limitations stem mainly from the ideological struggle between contending systems of diverse public order that should be recognized before
offering suggestions to improve the existing collective machinery to resolve internal
conflicts with possible international repercussions.
The writer's thinking has been largely influenced by the writings and teachings of
Professors Myres McDougal, Leon Lipson, and Harold Lasswell of Yale Law School.
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In doing so, this study will critically examine the following two areas:
1) claims made, strategies used, and outcomes accomplished by a major participant in the controversy -the United States; and 2) the
validity of its claims and acts under both applicable treaty laws and
relevant norms of customary international law. Some of these norms
are couched in self-serving concepts such as "intervention," "nonintervention," "self-determination," "self-defense," and distinctions
of dubious validity such as "rebellion," "insurgency," and "belligerency." Furthermore, these concepts have become hopelessly inadequate to describe and analyze the intricate issues of a Dominicantype situation.
Recommendations made in this paper pertain to: 1) setting up
regional and international fact-finding agencies; and 2) community
review of the unilateral use of coercive measures through regional and
international tribunals. Assumed throughout the discussion is the
desirability of a collective, rather than an individual, use of coercion.
I. THE PROCESS OF CLAIMS

The United States as a major participant in the Dominican conflict made claims which varied according to audience and occasion.
Claims made in the post-crisis period did not necessarily have the
same emphasis as those forwarded during the crisis period. Furthermore, both during and after the crisis the focus of particular claims
occasionally shifted with the changing objectives of the United States.
A. Claims by the United States27
The United States made the following major claims:
1) Claim to protect Americans and other foreign nationals.
2) Claim to restore internal law and order and maintain it until
the formation of a government capable of doing so.
3) Claim to uphold values and principles shared by the regional
system and thus prevent the creation of "another Cuba" in
the Western Hemisphere.
4) Claim to assume competence initially to give the Organization of American States competence when it was ready for it.
5) Claim based on collective self-defense to meet any danger to
peace and security of the hemisphere.
6) Claim to uphold the competence and propriety of the OAS
over the United Nations to deal with a regional conflict.
7) Claim that the establishment of the Inter-American Peace
27 These claims are taken from the official pronouncements of the United States decisionmakers. The sources used are the Congressional Records, the United States Department
of State Bulletins and the United Nations and the OAS documents.
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Force was not an enforcement action under article 53 of the
United Nations Charter and hence did not require prior
authorization by the Security Council.
8) Claim that the United States' action did not violate its treaty
commitments under the charters of the OAS and United
Nations.
9) Claim that the United States' action did not defeat the principle of self-determination for the Dominican people.
10) Claim to provide relief and rehabilitation measures.
For a more detailed account of the United States' claims and their
analysis, these claims will be further studied under three broad categories:
1) Claim to protect the United States nationals and other foreign nationals.
2) Claim to prevent a Communist take-over.
3) Claim to take unilateral action to give OAS competence to
deal with the situation; in later stages, claim to uphold the
competence of the regional organization to deal with the
regional conflict without interference from the United
Nations.
II.

CLAIM TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES NATIONALS

The audience for this claim was the world at large; more specifically, public opinion at home and in Latin American countries, the
OAS and the United Nations.
The United States State Department Memorandum entitled "Legal Basis for U.S. Actions in the Dominican Republic," 8 opens with
the statement that it was "an emergency action taken to protect
lives ...."' The initial landing of the United States troops is said
to be "under conditions in which immediate action was essential to
preserve the lives of foreign nationals - nationals of the United
States and of many other countries. This kind of action is justified
both on humanitarian and legal grounds."3 The action was taken
after the United States had been officially notified by Dominican
authorities that they were no longer able to preserve order. The factual
circumstances of the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republican [sic] were such that the landing could not have been delayed

beyond the time it actually took place without needless sacrifice of
lives ...[including] foreign nationals .... 31
28Ill CONG. REC. 10733-34 '(daily ed. May 20, 1965).
29

30

ld. at 10733.

Ibid.
31 Id. at 10734. Senator Wayne Morse said that this memorandum "would not receive a
passing grade in any law... school in the United States." Ibid.
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President Johnson made his first public statement on sending the
United States troops to the Dominican Republic on the evening of
April 28. This action, he said, was "necessary in this situation in order
to protect American lives.""2 He explained the situation further: the
military authorities in the Dominican Republic had informed the
United States Government that American lives were in danger, that
those authorities were "no longer able to guarantee their safety" and
had reported that the assistance of military personnel was "now
needed for that purpose."33 Four hundred marines were, therefore,
sent ashore "in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans...
still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this
country.""4
In another statement made two days later the President reiterated
that the reason for sending the American forces into Santo Domingo
was "to protect the lives of Americans .... ." The United States
Government had taken this step, he said, "when, and only when, we
were officially notified by police and military officials of the Dominican Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the
safety of American and foreign nationals and to preserve law and
order."3 In his later statements, on May 136 and May 2," the President further clarified the United States' objective - the protection of
the United States nationals and their safe evacuation. It was not,
however, until May 2 that for the first time the President mentioned
another goal for the United States forces: the goal "to help prevent
another Communist state in this hemisphere." 8
Notwithstanding subsequent assertions regarding the United
States' objective of preventing "another Cuba,"" the United States
Government consistently took the position that the initial landing of
its forces was solely for the protection of the lives of its citizens and
other nationals. Almost all leading United States public officials
associated with decision-making in foreign affairs, made statements to
32 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 738 (1965).

33Ibid.
34 The President also said that the same assistance would be "available to the nationals
of other countries some of whom have already asked for our help." For a letter from
the United States representative at the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, to the president of the Security Council informing him of the United States' action, see U.N. Doc.
No. S/6310 (1965). Stevenson gives exactly the same reasons as mentioned by the
President for the landing of the United States Marines without, however, mentioning
the protection for foreign nationals. Id. at 1. The text of the President's statement of
April 28 is contained id. at 2.
35 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 742 (1965).
38
Id. at 743.
3

7 Id. at 744.
38 Id. at 747.

39 The author will examine this claim in part two of this article.
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that effect; the list includes Ambassadors Stevenson," Bunker," and
Bennett;' Secretary of State Rusk;43 Undersecretaries Mann," and
Ball ;45 State Department Legal Adviser Meeker;" and the President's
special representative to the Dominican Republic and former Ambassador, John B. Martin."
A June 17, 1965, statement by President Johnson made at a
White House news conference on United States policy will further
confirm this conclusion. He recalled the situation in Santo Domingo
immediately prior to his decision to send the United States troops. He
was talking on the telephone with Ambassador Bennett in Santo Domingo who, the President said, was "talking to us from under a desk
while bullets were going through his windows, and he had a thousand
American men, women, and children assembled in the hotel who were
pleading with their President for help to preserve their lives."' 8 The
President further said that:
as we had to go into the Congo to preserve the lives of American
citizens and haul them out when they were being shot at, we went

into the Dominican Republic to preserve the lives of American citizens and the citizens of a good many other nations ....
We removed
5,600 people from 46 nations, and we didn't sprain an ankle doing
it.49

A. Past Trends
Under the traditional international law of the nineteenth century a state's claim to use its armed forces for the protection of its
nationals and their property was considered a valid exercise of its
rights. 0 During that period powerful states unhesitatingly followed
this practice. To illustrate, the United States, in pursuance of this
objective, is reported to have sent its forces on foreign lands more
than seventy times during the 19th century and early part of the 20th
40 52 DEP'T STATE BULL.

876 (1965).

41Id. at 739-40.
42 111 CONG. REC.

23668, 23669 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1965) (speech in Atlanta).
(press conference, May 26).

43 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 938 (1965)
4'53 id. at 733-34 (Nov.8, 1965).
45 52 id. at 1045-46 (June 28, 1965).

id. at 61-62, 64 (July 12, 1965).
4'Martin, Inside the Drama and Chaos of the Dominican Upheaval, Life, May 28, 1965,
reprinted in 111 CONG. REc. 23299 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965).
46 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 19, 20 (July 5, 1965). (Emphasis added.)
49Id. at 20.
50For a brief account of the 19th century practices, see BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 289-301 (1963). See generally BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1916); Clark, Right to Protect Citizens in
ForeignCountries by Landing Forces(Memorandum for the Dep't of State, 3d ed. 1934) ;
DUNN, PROTECTION OF NATIONALS (1932). For the bases of state responsibility, see
Eagleton, Responsibility of States in InternationalLaw (1928), Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (12th
Draft, Sohn & Baxter Reporters, 1961).
4653
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century." Several jurists, past and present, have also ungrudgingly
supported such a use of force by states.12 Starke, for example, enumerates among what he calls the "principal exceptional cases in which
a State has at international law a legitimate right of intervention,"
the case "to protect the rights and interests, and the personal safety
of its citizens abroad." 3
Notwithstanding the wide acceptance of this claim during the
earlier period, many doubts have recently been raised concerning its
continued validity as a right. The main concern of the jurists is that a
powerful state could abuse this alleged right by employing it as a
handy pretext to use force for its preferred political objectives. 4
The asserted legality of this claim can be challenged on the
ground that nowhere is this alleged right specifically excepted from
the prohibitions on the use of force contained in the United Nations
Charter, especially in article 2(4)." However, it can be argued
that the saving clause contained in article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, the inherent right of self-defense, " validates the claim; the
51

52

OFFUTT, PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES, chs. 2-4 (1928). See also Clark note 50 supra; BORCHARD, op. cit. supra

note 50.
VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA Lor NATURALLE, Bk. II, ch. VI,
§ 71 (1758) in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1916), is often cited as authority
in support of this customary right. HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
LAW AND ORGANIZATION 238-39 (rev. ed. 1927) considers the forcible means em-

ployed by a state "to protect the lives and property of the nationals of the intervening
State..." legally justifiable if they are taken "as a last resort." BROWNLIE, op. Cit.
supra note 50, at 289 nn.3-7 cites writers including Hall, Westlake, and Wheaton who
port this doctrine on theories of self defense, self-preservation, and necessity. But cf.
statement by HALL, Forward to A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (4th ed.
1895):
Interventions, whether armed or diplomatic, undertaken either for the reason
or upon the pretexts of cruelty, or oppression, or the horrors of a civil war,
or whatever the reason put forward, supported in reality by the justification
which such facts offer to the popular mind, would have had to justify
themselves, when not authorised [sic) by the whole body of civilised [sic)
states accustomed to act together for common purposes, as measures which,
being confessedly illegal in themselves, could only be excused in rare and
extreme cases in consideration of the unquestionably extraordinary character
of the facts causing them, and of the evident purity of the motives and conduct of the intervening state.
53 STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (4th ed. 1958).
54See, e.g., BROWNLIE, op. cit. supra note 50, at 301 ; Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered From the Standpoint of the Rule of Lw, 92
RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 172 (11-1957) ; Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 RECUEIL DES COURs 5, 240-42 (11-1962). See also HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE

UNITED NATIONS 220-21 (1963).

55U.N.CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
56 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 provides in part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
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rationale would be that self-defense of the state is no different from
the self-defense of its nationals. 7
However, even if the alleged right of a state to protect nationals
be still considered valid under the customary right of self-defense, it
is not an arbitrary right unfettered by community standards to regulate it; it is a legal right58 and its validity can certainly be tested under the generally accepted standards laid down by Secretary of State
Webster in the well-known Carolinecase. 9 The case arose out of an
incident on December 29, 1837, when the British Armed Forces entered the United States territory from Canada and seized and destroyed the steamer Caroline which had been employed by persons
illegally helping an insurrection in Canada. The incident resulted in
the death of two United States citizens as well. The British Minister
at Washington justified this action as a legitimate measure of selfdefense. In a later communication, Secretary of State Webster asserted what later became a classic statement, that in order to have its
act qualify as a valid exercise of self-defense, Great Britain must show
a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation.""0 Furthermore, he said
that even if the necessity of the moment had authorized the local
Canadian authorities to enter United States territory, Great Britain
must also show that they "did nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence,
must be limited
1
it."'within
clearly
kept
and
necessity,
that
by
It should also be recalled that the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg had reaffirmed that the asserted legality of a preventive action in the territory of another state must be tested by Webster's
requirements in the Carolinecase.'
As an illustration of the assertion of a state's right to protect its
nationals, the following statement by Secretary of State Hughes at the
57 See generally

on self-defense BowETT, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
For the application of this doctrine in the OAS context, see THOMAS &
THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 162 (1963). See also CHENG,
(1961).

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL

COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 101 (1953); STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 94-97

'(1958). For the United States' views on the right of self-defense in the context of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, see U.S. Foreign Relations 36 (1-1928).
68 See generally BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 315-21 (5th ed. 1955). Brierly says
that,
Self-defence, properly understood, is a legal right, and as with other
legal rights the question whether a specific state of facts warrants its exercise
is a legal question. It is not a question on which a state is entitled, in any
special sense, to be a judge in its own cause.
Id. at 319.

5 See generally Jennings, Tbe Carofine andMcLeod C

-,, 3
. JI.Nl L 82 (1938).
60 Communication of April 24, 1841. See 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129,
1138 (1-1840) ; 30 id. at 193 (cited in Jennings, supra note 59, at 85 n.11, 89 n.31).

61 Jennings, supra note 59, at 89.
62 See 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1947).

1966

DOMINICAN CRISIS

Sixth International Conference of American States at Havana in 1928
is often cited:
What are we to do when government breaks down and American
citizens are in danger of their lives? Are we to stand by and see them
killed because a government in circumstances which it cannot control and for which it may not be responsible can no longer afford
reasonable protection?
I am speaking of the occasions [when the] government itself is
unable to function for a time because of difficulties which confront
it and which it is impossible for it to surmount.
Now it is a principle of international law that in such a case a
government is fully justified in taking action - I would call it interposition of a temporary character - for the purpose of protecting
the lives and property of its nationals. . . .Of course the United
States cannot forego its right to protect its citizens. 61
Secretary Hughes was thus expressly emphasizing the requirements of
both the necessity and proportionality of the action of a state in using
force to meet the community standards.

It is, however, of relatively recent origin that the community of
nations has started a collective review of a state's assertion of its right
to use coercive measures to protect its nationals. The following discussion will examine the response of the League of Nations and the
United Nations to selected instances wherein states had asserted such
rights.
One such instance was the response by the League Council to the
Japanese claim that Japan had legally dispatched its armed forces to
Manchuria on September 18, 1931. The Japanese plea was in part
based on the asserted right of self-defense undertaken for the protection of the lives and property of its nationals."
Addressing the League Council the Japanese representative justified his country's occupation of Manchuria on the aggregate of Japanese treaty rights and on the
vital and justified measures of self-protection as the standard principle laid down in the Caroline case, that every act of self-defence
must depend for its justification on the importance of the interests
to be defended, or the imminence of the danger and on the necessity of

the act ....

65

In the Council discussion the Chinese representative took issue
with the Japanese claim and called it "a dangerous principle to assert
that, in order to protect nationals and their property in a foreign
country, a large number of troops may occupy so many places, destroy
so much property and kill so many innocent people."" It is not clear
1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (chiefly as interpreted and applied by the United States).
"See, e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 2289-90 (1931). Excerpts from the remarks of
the Japanese representative at the League Council are contained in Brown, Japanese
Interpretationof the Kellogg Pact, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 100 (1933).
6 Brown, supra note 64, at 100.
66 Statement of 25 September 1931, LEAGUE OF NATIONs OFF. J. 2284 (1931).
6
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whether the Chinese representative was challenging a state's right to
use force for the protection of its nationals under any circumstances
or was merely suggesting that in the Manchurian incident the Japanese had not met the requirement of proportionality.67 The Council's
resolution of September 30, 1931, was equally ambiguous; it noted
the Japanese representative's statement that his "Government will
continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which
has already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety
of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured .... 68
Subsequently, the Council appointed the Lytton Commission"
to inquire into the matter. Meanwhile, Japanese troops landed in
Shanghai and one of the Japanese pleas to justify its action was again
the necessity to protect the Japanese nationals." The Lytton Commission reported that the Japanese military operations "could not be regarded as measures of [legitimate] self-defense."" The League Assembly adopted the Commission report and although there was some
discussion on the question of the validity of the Japanese claim of
self-defense based on the protection of its nationals in the resolution
adopted on the subject, the Assembly did not pass on this claim. 2
In the United Nations context three claims to use force to protect
a state's nationals will be briefly examined here: first, the British
claim during the 1956 Suez crisis; second, the United States claim
during the landing of its troops in Lebanon; and third, the Belgian
claim to use its troops in the Congo crisis in 1960.
The following statement by Anthony Eden, then British Prime
Minister, in the House of Commons debate on the Israeli-Egyptian situation, sets out the British claim clearly. While referring
specifically to the Tripartite Declaration73 of the prohibition of the
use of force under the United Nations Charter, he said:
we do maintain, and I think I must fairly say, that there is nothing in
the Tripartite Declaration or in the Charter which abrogates the right
of a Government to take such steps as are essential to protect the lives

of their citizens and vital rights such as are here at stake.

....

74

67 For a discussion on this point, see BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF

FORCE BY STATES 242, 294-96 (1963).
68 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 2307 (1931).
69

Id. at 2374.

70

LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 331, 345 (1932). But see, SHINOBU, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE SHANGHAI CONFLICT 119-20 (1933).
71 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., SPEC. SUPp. 112, at 72 (1933).
72

See

generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., SPEC. SUPP. 111 (1933).

73 Declaration of May 25, 1950. The signatories were the Governmnents of the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States. See 22 DEP'T STATE BULL. 886 (1950) for

the text of the Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East. The threepower statement was issued to the press on May 25, 1950.
74 558 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 1277 (1956) cited in 5 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 643 (1965).
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Again, intervening in the House of Commons debate, Eden said
that,
In the present international system, where the Security Council is
subject to the veto, there must be the right for individual countries to
intervene in an emergency to take action to defend their own nationals and their own interests .... We have got to reserve to ourselves
the right to take the necessary action in an emergency at the time we
think fit.7"
He also argued that the right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51
of the Charter covered the situation where there was an imminent
threat to the nationals of a state and that it was not necessary to wait
until an attack had been actually launched. 6
In a House of Lords debate on November 1, the Lord Chancellor
had defended the United Kingdom's action on three grounds, one of
them being, "the danger to our nationals (for example to those at
Ismalia) .,7
The United Nations, however, did not have an occasion to pass
on the validity of the British claim, the main reason being the multiplicity of other important claims involved in the conflict, for example,
the claims to prevent the Egypt-Israeli conflict from spreading further,
to protect the canal and its valuable installations from possible harm,
and to remove the risk to free passage through the canal. 78 Although
the French Government never forwarded the claim to protect its nationals as an official justification for its use of force,7" both the United
Kingdom and the French Governments in their notes verbales of December 3, 1956, informed the Secretary General that they had instructed the Allied Commander to seek agreement with the United
Nations Commander on a time table for the complete withdrawal of
their forces and asked that "the position of British and French nationals in Egypt should be fully guaranteed."8
The United States' claim to send its forces to Lebanon was based
in part on the right "to protect American lives." This claim is succinctly stated by President Eisenhower in the following message to
the Congress:
United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon
75 Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, 103 RECUEIL DES COURs 347, 400 (II1961).
76 Ibid. See also Queen Elisabeth's Prerogation Speech of November 5, 1956, contained
77

in 199 H.L. DaB. (5th ser.) 1380-81 (1956).
199 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 1353 (1956).

78 See U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 1st Emer. Spec. Sess., 561st Plenary Meeting at para. 220,

for the French representative's statement. For the British representative's remarks, see
id. at para. 73. (A/OR/ES-I/PV561) (1956). See also Eden's remarks 558 H.C. DEB.
(5th ser.) 1343-44 (1956).
79 The French representative's remarks, supra note 78, at 220.
80 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, at 28, 29 (A/3415).
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in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace.8 1
Prior to that action the United Nations had sent observers into Lebanon to see that further outside assistance to the insurrection would
cease. 2 It was, however, the forcible overthrow of the Iraqi Government that had precipitated the events. The United States' action was
discussed both in the Security Council and the General Assembly.
The Security Council adopted no resolution on the subject, mainly
because of the Soviet veto. The General Assembly did not officially
pass on the legality of the claim either." The troops were subsequently withdrawn and the incident subsided."
The avowed purpose of Belgium in reinforcing its troops in the
Republic of the Congo on July 9, 1960, was to protect its nationals
from the grave consequences of disorder that had erupted in Leopoldville on July 2, 1 9 6 0 ,1 and had spread widely during the next

week. One commentator has recently remarked that despite the apparent inconsistencies of the initial moves by the Belgian Government in the Congo crisis, it was also apparent that "all Belgians were
justifiably concerned with protecting Belgian lives and property
throughout the Congo."'
On July 12, the Secretary-General received a written cable from
the Congolese authorities soliciting urgent United Nations "military
assistance" to meet the Belgian "aggression." The United Nations
response to the Belgian action was a resolution by the Security Council on July 14, 1960," which called upon "the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the
Congo." The same resolution authorized the Secretary-General to
provide the Congolese Government with military assistance. Later
resolutions reiterated the Council demand that Belgium withdraw all
of its troops from the Congo.8 Attention at the United Nations was,
however, soon directed to other serious aspects of the Congo crisis
which arose mainly from the Katangeese Secession and the grow81
82

39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 182 (1958).
U.N.Doc. No. S/4023 (1958).

See generally U.N. Doc. No. S/PV.827 '(1958). See the proposed Security Council
resolutions and discussions in U.N. Docs. Nos. S/4050/Rev. 1, S/PV.834 and
S/4055/Rev. 1, S/PV.837 (1958). For the General Assembly resolutions see U.N.
Doc. No. A/3893/Rev. 1, A/PV.746, A/RES/1237 (E.S.-II) (1958). For President
Eisenhower's address to the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, see
U.N. Doc. No. A/PV.733, at 7-10 (1958).
84 For a discussion of some aspects of the Lebanon incident, see Potter, Legal Aspects
of the Beirut Landing, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 727 (1958); Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959).
85itwas the third day of the Congolese independence. For a brief account, see LEFEVER,
CRISIS IN THE CONGO, 10-11 (1965).
88 LEFEVER, op. cit. supra note 85, at 30.
87
U.N. Doc. No. S/4387 (1960), adopted by a vote of 8-0-3 (China, France and the
88 United Kingdom).
See, e.g.,
U.N. Doc. Nos. S/4405 (1960) ; S/4426 (1960) ; S/4741 '(1961).
8
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ing internal conflicts within the Republic of the Congo. As a result,
the initial Belgium claim to protect its nationals was never officially
rejected; it was not approved either. Nevertheless, two implications
can be drawn from the United Nations actions in sending its forces to
assist the Congolese authorities and in repeatedly demanding the
withdrawal of all Belgian troops. They are, one, the Katangeese Secession made the Belgian motives look suspect; and, two, in view of
the action by the international community it was considered imperative that the unilateral action should cease.
As is evident from the preceding analysis these three cases which
on the surface seem relevant to the issues of the paper, provide no
guidelines to the decision-makers for appraising the permissibility of
the Dominican situation.
B. Present Status of the Law
State practices and the community review in the United Nations
do not provide adequate standards for evaluating the Dominican situation and for future prediction. We might, however, examine the
pronouncements of the international tribunals to seek clarification of
issues.
An important case in which the International Court of Justice
had occasion to discuss some aspects of the legality of a state's recourse to coercive measures, the Corfu Channel (Merits) case,8" will
be studied here. There, the Court was faced with the British claim of
having a right of innocent passage through the Corfu Strait. Furthermore, the United Kingdom was claiming justification for its subsequent action of mine-sweeping "Operation Retail," in the Channel on
the basis of "self-defense and self-redress" and of "self-protection"
or "self-help.'"'"
The British claim of "self-help" was, however, put forward as a
strictly limited measure undertaken with the sole objective of investigating the minefield and securing evidence. Albania had emphatically
denied the latter claim by the United Kingdom on the plea that such
actions had resulted in the violation of the Albanian Sovereignty.
The Court rejected the British claim, stating that,
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise
to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present
defects in international organization, find a place in international
law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular
form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be

reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself.9'
89

I.C.J. Rep. 4 [1949).

90 2

CORFU CHANNEL CASE-

PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS,

84 (I.C.J. 1950), 3 id. at 293-97; 4 id. at 572-92.
91 Corfu Channel Case, [19491 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35.

AND DOCUMENTS 280-
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The following discussion will show that the Court's pronouncements in this case and several jurists' comments thereupon also failed
to set any measurable standards to determine the permissibility of a
state's recourse to coercive measures.

Professor Lauterpacht, for example, observes that this part of
the judgment
amounts to an outspoken restriction of the sovereignty of States as
traditionally interpreted and as implying the rights of intervention.
Obviously, it indirectly affirms at the same time the right of sovereign States to immunity from intervention
on the part of other
92
States. To that extent it protects sovereignty.

The Court's rejection of the British claim that it was entitled to
remove an international nuisance caused by the minefield in the Corfu
Strait, would, in part, confirm Professor Lauterpacht's observation.
While specifically rejecting this plea of self-protection or self-help,
the Court said that it could not accept this defense either. It further
said that between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty was an "essential foundation of international relations."
The Court recognizes that the Albanian Government's complete
failure to carry out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory
nature of its diplomatic notes, are extenuating circumstances for the
action of the United Kingdom . . . [In order to] ensure respect for
international law . . . the Court must declare that the action of the
93

British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian Sovereignty.

However, the Court's pronouncement regarding the "respect for
territorial sovereignty," which Lauterpacht termed as amounting to
an "outspoken restriction . .. [on] intervention" does not set any
measurable standards as to when and under what circumstances and
in the assertion of what rights and in what intensities a state's use of
coercive measures would be considered justifiable.9 Does the Court's
pronouncement amount to an "emphatic rejection.., of the right of
intervention..."?95

In an earlier part of the judgment covering the right of innocent
passage, for example, the Court had said that the legality of the
92

LAUTERPACHT,

THE

DEVELOPMENT

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW BY THE INTERNA-

TIONAL COURT 317 (1958).

9 Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35.
9' For representative writing on important aspects of the Court's judgment, see BowETr,
op. cit. supra note 57, at 14-15 (1958) ; BROWNLIE, op. cit. supra note 50, at 28389; Fitzmaurice, supra note 54, at 172; Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1950) ; LAUTERPACHT,
op. cit. supra note 92 at 87-90, 316-17, 335-36, 392; McDoUGAL & FELICIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 225-27 (1961); Schwarzenberger, The
Fundamental Principles of InternationalLaw, 87 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, at 339-48
(1-1955) ; Schwarzenberger, Report on Some Aspects of the Principle of Self-Defense in the Charter of the United Nations .
22-24 (Int'l L. Assoc. 1958):
Sorensen, Principes de Droit international Public, 101 RECUEIL DES COURs 5, at
241-45 (111-1960) ; Waldock, supra note 54, at 237-40.
95 LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 92, at 90. But see id. n.47: "There is room for
the, possibly pedantic, question: If intervention can find no place in international
law at all, can it be said that it is 'perhaps' less admissible in some cases than in others?"
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United Kingdom's action in sending four warships through the Corfu
Strait could not be disputed,
[P]rovided it was carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of international law. The 'mission' was designed to affirm a
right which had been unjustly denied. The Government of the

United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from exercising its right
of passage, which the Albanian Government had illegally denied.96
After making a contextual analysis, the Court was "unable to characterize these measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a
violation of Albania's sovereignty."97
Professor Waldock reads in the Court's opinion
a sharp distinction between forcible affirmation of legal rights

against a threatened unlawful attempt to prevent their exercise and
forcible self-help to obtain redress for rights already violated; the

first it accepted as legitimate, the second it condemned as illegal.9 8
He further adds that "[Allthough the legitimacy of affirming the
exercise of a legal right was upheld . . . it is not the enjoyment of
every right possessed by a State under international law that may be
affirmed by force .
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice comes to a similar
conclusion:
The Court naturally distinguished clearly between this case - that is
the use or threat of force in (and where necessary for) the active and
current assertion of a right, and its use to remedy a wrong already
committed (other of course than one itself involving the illegitimate
use of force). The Court thus differentiated the cases in which forcible self-help is justified from those in which it is not. The test seems
to be, broadly, whether the self-help is analogous to self-defence, because used defensively to counter or prevent an attempt by force to
deny a right; or whether, on the other hand, it takes the form of
punishment or coercion carried out in cases where it is alleged that a
wrong has already been committed, or a right denied. 1°°

The Court's pronouncement and the foregoing statements by
Lauterpacht, Waldock and Fitzmaurice make nebulous reference to
the terms "legal right," "right of intervention," "territorial sovereignty," and the distinction between the "enjoyment" of a "legal
right" and its "exercise." It is certainly not in the exercise of every
legal right that the use of force, in varying intensities, should be
considered justified. The legality or illegality of the use of intense
coercive measures must necessarily depend upon several factors, including the nature and intensity of the coercive measure, the nature
of the "legal right," and the outcome of the measures undertaken.
The outcome or the consequentiality would include "the importance
and number of values affected, the extent to which such values are
Corfu Channel Case, [ 1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 30.
9 Id. at 31.
98 Waldock, supra note 54, at 240.
99 Ibid.
100 Fitzmaurice, supra note 54, at 172 (footnotes omitted). See also Fitzmaurice, The Law
and Procedure of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1 (1950).
96
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affected, and the number of participants whose values are so affected.""'' Similarly "intervention"'0 2 is a highly ambiguous term.
As a state may "intervene" for various objectives, employing any one
or a combination of different strategies - diplomatic, ideological,
economic or military,0 3 ranging from a "friendly" diplomatic chat,
beaming "informative" programs across national lines on radio and
television, granting or discontinuing economic aid, to sending warships to patrol waters adjacent to land masses, giving armed assistance
to an insurrection movement, or landing armed forces in another state,
and using different gradations of coercion, the Court's pronouncement, its asserted "outspoken restriction . . . [on] intervention" is
of dubious value to decision-makers and observers alike.
The concept, "intervention" is ambiguous since it may refer
to any one or a combination of the following -the
factual content of the situation, that is, the events; claimed or projected legal
consequences of the facts assumed, asserted or ascertained; or the
likely or actual responses of the authoritative decision-makers to the
claims made. Thus, in order to give an empirical reference to the
high-sounding verbiage surrounding the concept of "intervention" it
is imperative that a multifactoral, contextual analysis of the events
which allegedly constitute "intervention" and their outcome be undertaken to determine the permissibility or impermissibility of the conduct of participants. Such an analysis would take into account the
nature and intensities of the coercive measures undertaken, the participants undertaking these measures, their objectives, the strategies
used by them, and the outcome of the measures undertaken.
A redefinition of the term "claim to intervene" in the context of
this paper would mean, in general, the claim by a state"° to employ
military coercion or military interference across state lines in an internal conflict situation." 5 More specifically, this claim would be
made in a situation when the other state faces a total collapse or at
least a partial breakdown with possible serious consequences of in101 McDoUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 15. See generally id. at 1-96.
02
1 See generally STRANGER ed., ESSAYS ON INTERVENTION (1964), especially by Burke,
The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A Framework of Inquiry, id.
at 87-125; Fawcett, Intervention in InternationalLaw, 103 RECuEIL DES COURS 347
(11-1961) ; THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN
THE AMERICAS (1956).

103 For an extensive treatment, see MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. sit. supra note 94, at
309-33.

104itwould normally be a more powerful state in relationship with the state against
which it is claiming the right to use coercive measures.
105It is realized that a distinction between internal and international conflicts is seldom
easy to make. The Spanish civil war and the present Vietnam conflict are the prime
examples- However, two important distinguishing features of the conflicts primarily
internal from international conflicts are: 1) physical location of these conflicts-their
limited geographical character; and 2) a unanimous or near unanimous accord of major
participants in the effective power process to treat these conflicts as primarily internal
with an implicit understanding not to extend their areas of operations. See generally
ROSENAu ed., INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE (1964).
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ternal public order and is unable to give the necessary protection to
the nationals of the claimant state. It should be emphasized that although other types of "interventionary" activity certainly exist, they
cannot be adequately dealt with within the confines of this paper.
After a careful study of several situations in which such claims
were made, Fawcett comes to the conclusion that,
The customary right of intervention for the protection of nationals
or their property is therefore now severely restricted: its exercise is
admissible only in the clearest cases, it must serve no other purpose
than protection from immediate danger, and must be discontinued as
soon as that has been achieved." 6
Professor Waldock has succinctly summed up the present status
of law in this area. He says,
Clearly, every effort must be made to get the local government to intervene effectively and, failing that, to obtain its permission for independent action; equally clearly every effort must be made to get
the United Nations to act. But, if the United Nations is not in a position to move in time and the need for instant action is manifest, it
would be difficult to deny the legitimacy of action in defence of
nationals which every responsible government would feel bound to
take, if it had the means to do so; this is, of course, on the basis that
the action was strictly
limited to securing the safe removal of the
07
threatened nationals.
Other writers including Lord McNair,"° Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,"° Brownlie,"' Bowett,"' and Van Panhys"1' are all in accord on
106Fawcett, supra note 102, at 405. He suggests that this right has not survived the prohi-

bitions of Articles 2 (3) (4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter. Id. at 404.
supra note 54, at 240-41.
108 Lord McNair mentions as an exception to the otherwise changed "attitude of international law ... towards the use or threat of armed force for the purpose of attaining
national objectives," the "emergency protection by a State of its nationals and its or their
property located in a foreign country when the local authorities are unable or unwilling
to give this protection." MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 209-10 (1961). McNair is
among a few jurists who still consider the right to protect the nationals' property also
justifiable.
109 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 54, at 172-73.
110 Unlike McNair, Brownlie denies the existence of this asserted right. He considers it
"very doubtful if the present form of intervention has any basis in the modern law ....
Forcible intervention is now unlawful." He, however, concedes that a state when it is
"faced with a deliberate massacre of a considerable number of nationals in a foreign
state would have cogent reasons of humanity for acting, and would also be under great
political pressure .... '[I]n a case of such urgency, an exceptional circumstance," he
adds, "the possible risks of denying the legality of action . . . must be weighed against
the more calculable dangers of providing legal pretexts for the commission of breaches
of the peace in the pursuit of national rather than humanitarian interests." BROWNLIE,
op. cit. supra note 50, at 301.
11 BowE-r, op. cit. supra note 57, at 105 reads:
Moreover, since the exercise of the right depends upon the international legal
system it must be capable of evaluation in the light of the standards imposed
by that system. This is particularly so where the right to resort to these extreme forms of protection is dependent upon a prior breach of the standards
of state responsibility imposed by that system. If the question of breach is capable of being objectively determined, then the reaction to that breach must be
equally so.
212VAN PANHYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-14 (1959):
"Such flagrant ill-treatment may occur that drastic action on the part of the national
State maybe morally justified as an ultimatum remedium if international organizations
such as the Security Council fail to act."
'0r Waldock,
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restricting the permissibility of this claim to meet the related standards
of necessity"' and proportionality." 4 Professor McDougal's reminder
that,
[T]he requirements of necessity and proportionality as ancillary prescriptions of the basic community policy prohibiting change by
violence, can ultimately be subjected only to that most comprehensive
and fundamental test of all law, reasonableness in particular context ... 115
is equally well applicable in the present context.
Viewed as such, a state's claim to intervene for the protection of

its national should be considered permissible only in rare instances.
Widespread abuse of this right in the past and the temptation to exercise it as a smokescreen for other political objectives make this claim
highly suspect. The nebulous concept of "nationality" in some instances, for example, in dual nationality cases, may add another dimension to the problem. Only when a state is left with no other recourse - diplomatic on its part and collective in terms of regional
and international organizations - and only when the danger to their
lives, and not their property alone, is imminent, could this claim be
considered justifiable. One could perhaps not dispute the ultimate
justification of the use of coercive measures in such a situation because the "loss of life and certain kinds of grave physical injury are
irremediable. No subsequent action, remedy, redress or compensation
can bring the dead to life or restore their limbs to the maimed. There
is no remedy except prevention.
In addition to the general prohibitions against the use of coercive measures across state lines contained in the United Nations Charter,"7 the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) has
further restricted "intervention" on the part of member states. It says:
No State, or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed
force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of
the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements." 8
Furthermore, the OAS Charter is even more emphatic in its prohibition on the use of force when it declares the territory of a State to

be "inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military
113 For an excellent formulation in the broader context of self-defense, see generally McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 217-41.
114 McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 241-44. See also Weightman, SellDefense in InternationalLaw, 37 VA. L. REv. 1095, 1097 (1951).
115 McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 218.
116 Fitzmaurice, supra note 54, at 173.
117 U.N. CHARTER ch. 1, art. 2, para.

"

8

0.A.S. CHARTER ch. 3, art. 15.
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by another State,
occupation or of other measures of force taken
19
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.'
Latin American jurists are especially critical of a state's assertion
of its "right" as a permissible self-defense measure to take coercive
Moreover, these jurists reflect their
action to protect its nationals.'
states' attitudes as well. These attitudes, in turn, stem from the past
experiences of the Latin American States' and are further reflected
in their codes and treaties dealing with the subject."2 However, it can
be argued that similar to the right of self-defense contained in Article
51 of the United Nations Charter, Article 18 of the OAS Charter also
authorizes the use of force in an exceptional case, "the case of selfdefense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof."
It has also been argued that the Punta del Este declaration of January
1962, attempting to stem the Communist aggression in the Western
Hemisphere constitutes another exception. The OAS Charter also
contains another provision to the effect that, "Measures adopted for
the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing
treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in
Articles 15 and 17."'12
While a discussion of the preventive and anticipatory aspects of
124
self-defense posed by Article 51 is beyond the reach of this paper,
another aspect of Article 51 is pertinent to our discussion here. That
is, when Article 51 refers to an armed attack "against a Member of
the United Nations," it can be argued that an attack against the nationals of a state constitutes an attack against the state and hence the
defense of nationals amounts to the defense of the state. 2' Finally,
if coercive measures by a state could be considered permissible when
undertaken to protect its nationals from an attack by another state,
such measures could certainly be considered permissible when undertaken to protect nationals from anarchy, that is, when nationals were
attacked by individuals and not the state. Moreover, while there may
be doubt on the permissibility of a state's use of coercive measures in
119O.A.S. CHARTER ch. 3, art. 17. (Emphasis added.)
120 See,

e.g.,

SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE:

A

PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTER-

NATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY (1955).

121 During the first quarter century, the United States troops had landed four times in the
Dominican Republic-in 1903, 1904, 1914, and 1916. From 1916 to 1924 they had
occupied the Dominican territory. U.S. News and World Report, May 1, 1961, p. 43.
122E.g., O.A.S. CHARTER ch. 3, arts. 15, 17. But see Plank, The Caribbean:Intervention,
When and How, 44 FN.AFFRS. 37'(1965).
13 O.A.S.CHARTER ch. 3, art. 19.
124 See, e.g., BowETT,SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 182-248 (1958); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 232-60; cf. KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS
IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1951). On the recent discussion regarding
the Cuban Quarantine measures by the United States, see several articles and comments
in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. at 373, 515, 525, 546, 588, 592, 597 (1963).
125See, e.g., BOWETT,op. cit. supra note 124, at91-105 and the sources mentioned therein.
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the former instance, the prior discussion leads one to the conclusion
that under extreme circumstances coercive measures taken by a state
might be considered permissible in the latter situation provided those
measures meet the criteria of necessity and proportionality.
III.

VALIDITY OF THE UNITED STATES' CLAIMS

Thus the United States' claim of sending Marines to protect its
nationals should be examined to see if it meets the strict standards of
necessity and proportionality. It is only then that the permissibility of
the United States' action could be determined. Before undertaking
that examination, however, it is interesting to observe how the United
States' officials met the questions of legal prohibitions on the use of
force under Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter.
A. Official United States' Position
Ambassador Bunker is thus implying that the prohibitions of Articles 15 and 17 are not applicable to the United States' action; he
of Foreign Affairs, on April 30, 1965. He argued that,
[Because] of the solemn duty which each state has to protect its citizens ...

from violence in a situation where there are no authorities

to insure their protection .... The United States must reserve its
right to take the necessary measures to protect its own citizens and
officials from violence in a situation of anarchy. 26
Ambassador Bunker must have had the prohibitions of Articles 15
and 17 of the OAS Charter in mind when he said that the United
States' action was not "inconsistent with the inter-American obligations. We wholeheartedly subscribe to these obligations, including the
doctrine of nonintervention and self-determination."' 27 He further
added:
We are not talking about intruding in the domestic affairs of other
countries; we are talking simply about the elementary duty to save
lives in a situation where there is no authority able to accept responsibility for primary law and order.' 28

Ambassador Bunker is thus implying that the prohibitions of Articles 15 and 17 are not applicable to the United States' action; he
does not spell out the legal basis for this conclusion but perhaps he is
alluding here to the right of self-defense.
Justifying the United States' action, Ambassador Stevenson took
a similar position in the Security Council. He declared:
The obligations of nonintervention contained in articles 15 and 17
of the OAS Charter did not preclude the use of armed forces for the
humanitarian purpose of saving lives of foreigners. Nor did those

obligations require the United States to withdraw its forces imme126 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 739, 740 (1965).
12 Ibid. See also another statement by Bunker
128 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 739, 740 (1965).

to the same effect. Id. at 859.
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diately, when it was apparent that there was no local means of keeping order
pending the creating of a government capable of keeping
129
order.
He tried, however, to justify the presence of American troops by referring to the purposes and principles of the OAS Charter and the
Inter-American System. He specifically mentioned what he called the
"first purpose of the Organization of American States," that is, "to
achieve an order of peace and justice."'3 0 He also mentioned two
"basic" and "fundamental" principles of the Inter-American System,
which the OAS "seeks to promote throughout the hemisphere": 1)
"respect for the fundamental rights of the individual," and 2) "the
effective exercise of representative democracy." Ambassador Stevenson is obviously referring to Article 5 of the OAS Charter.' Thus,
the purpose of the United States' action was, in Stevenson's words,
to preserve the situation so that the organs of the inter-American
system may carry out their intended responsibilities under interAmerican treaties and assist the people of the Dominican Republic in
reestablishing
democratic government under conditions of public
32
order.

Similarly Leonard Meeker, the legal adviser to the State Department, argued that the use of coercive measures by the United States
should be considered permissible since they were taken in furtherance
of the primary purposes of the OAS Charter. The United States' action, he said, "gave the organs of the OAS the essential time in which

to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic and to determine
means of preserving the rights of that country under the inter-American system."' 3 3 In the House debate, Representative Selden forwarded the same argument that the United States troops were fulfilling the role of furthering Article 1 of the OAS Charter.'
The validity of the arguments by Stevenson, Meeker and Selden
as counterclaims to the "nonintervention" doctrine enunciated in Articles 15 and 17 may be challenged on the ground that since Articles 15
and 17 of the OAS Charter are contained in Chapter III entitled "Fundamental Rights and Duties of the States," no derogation from their
strict application can be justified by relying upon Articles 1 and 5.
However, a counter-argument could be made on the desirability of
interpreting a treaty keeping in view the major purposes of the
12

Id. at 876, 879.

This "primary" purpose is part of Article 1 of the OAS Charter. The other purposes
are: "to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their
sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence."
131 Article 5 of the Charter deals with political structure of member states, to be organized
"on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy."
132 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 876, 879 (1965).
130
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Address given before the Foreign Law Association at New York on June 9, 1965, 53
60, 62 (1965).
111 CONG. REC. 24077 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).

DEP'T STATE BULL.
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treaty.'
These arguments go beyond the immediate context of this
paper insofar as they relate to an effort to provide a legal justification
for the continued presence of the United States troops in the Dominican Republic; they might still have some bearing on the question if
the United States' action had met the required standard of proportionality.
B. Necessity of the United States' Action
Ambassador Stevenson's statement in the Security Council throws
sufficient light on the circumstances under which the United States is
reported to have taken coercive measures. He said:
First, on April 28, in the absence of governmental authority or law
enforcement, the military officials then exercising such authority as
there was in the Dominican Republic informed us that the safety of
foreign nationals could not be guaranteed any longer and that an
immediate dispatch of forces was necessary to safeguard their lives.
United States forces were sent only after that request, and we
promptly notified both the OAS and the United Nations. 136

Earlier, he had said in the Security Council:
[W]e could have decided not to do anything - at least for the time
being. But the lives of thousands of people from nearly 40 countries
hung in the balance....
The United States initially landed troops under these emergency
conditions to preserve the lives of foreign nationals - nationals of
the United States and of many other countries. Such action is justified both on humanitarian and legal grounds. 3 7

In the Senate debate on the Dominican situation, Senator Smath-

ers in a reply to Senator Fulbright also addressed himself to the necessity of the United States' action. In his words:
Remember the President did not send our troops until the revolution
had been going on for 4 days. Everybody's hindsight is better than
their foresight. It may be that there were not 1,560 people killed.
However, many of them were killed, and millions of dollars worth
of property was destroyed. Our Embassy was being fired upon. Other
embassies were being looted. Thank God our troops finally showed
138
up.

Four more statements, one each by the President, Secretary of
State Rusk, Undersecretary Mann, and Legal Advisor Meeker would
give a fairly representative picture of the United States' perception of
the overwhelming necessity of the situation that demanded an immediate United States response in dispatching its armed forces to the
Dominican Republic.
President Johnson said that "some 1500 innocent people were
murdered and shot, and their heads cut off, and six Latin American
e.g., MCNAIR, op. cit. supra note 108, at 380-81.
136 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 913, 915 (1965).
135 See,

137 Id. at 877.
138 111 CONG. REc. 23007 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).
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embassies were violated and fired upon over a period of 4 days before
we went in."' 39 Pointing to the urgency of the situation, he further
added:
As a matter of fact, we landed our people in less than one hour from
the time the decision was made. It was a decision we considered
from Saturday until Wednesday evening. But once we made it...
they landed within one hour. But they didn't save 1,500 lives. 140

In Secretary Rusk's words:
As late as 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that Wednesday, we had in
front of us reports from our Ambassador in which he himself was
not recommending that we use our own forces with respect to that
situation. But then, as you now know from other sources, the President and Secretary of Defense and I were in a meeting on another
matter and about 5:15 we were handed a telegram from our Ambassador, saying that the situation had completely deteriorated, disintegrated, that the police and the military authorities there had indicated
that they could no longer undertake responsibility for the security of
American and foreign nationals, and that if these people were to be
safe, U.S. forces would have to be employed. 4 1

Undersecretary Mann was quite emphatic when he said that since
there was no constituted authority in Santo Domingo to provide public order the United States had to take the immediate action to send
troops. "We did not consider it necessary to wait until innocent civilians had been killed in order to prove to the most skeptical that lives
were in danger. Had we done this we should have been derelict in our
duty to our citizens. 142
The following statement by Meeker regarding the breakdown of
law and public order suggests the necessity for the United States'
action:
The breakdown in public order resulted in indiscriminate shooting
on a rising scale. The police were no longer effective. Armed mobs
were terrorizing the city, firing on homes and other buildings, including the United States and other embassies. 4 1

He went on:
One possibility would have been to wait and see. There is no telling
how many American and other foreign nationals would have lost
their lives in mob violence if this course had been followed. There is
no telling how many hundreds and thousands of Dominican lives
would have been sacrificed needlessly in the armed civil strife that
had exploded in Santo Domingo' 44

Three further inquiries will be made here. One, statements challenging the United States' action on the basis of necessity will be
examined; two, the nature and source of the request from the Do139 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 19,20 (1965).

140
Id. at 21.
"4 52 id. at 942.
142 53 id. at 734.

143 1d. at 60, 61.
144Id. at 61-62.
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minican authorities will be looked into; and finally, the United States'
attitude on consultations with the OAS prior to its sending forces will
be studied.
1. Necessity of the United States' Action Challenged
The Soviet challenge to the United States' action was based on
the contention that although it was undertaken "on the pretext of
protecting American lives," its real reason lay in other political objectives.145
Similarly, the representative of the constitutional government
(the rebel faction) of the Dominican Republic, challenged the United
States' contention by asserting that "the lives of foreigners in the
Dominican Republic were at no time threatened...14
Statements by Senators Fulbright and Clark also challenged the
primary objective of the United States' action. "It is all very well to
talk about protecting American lives," Senator Clark said, "but the
real reason that the marines went in there was to prevent a Communist takeover."''
After conducting hearings on the Dominican Republic in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairman of
the Committee, Senator Fulbright, said, "The danger to American
lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention that began on the evening of April 28.'1 ' He further added:
"The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican Republic
S.. not primarily to save American lives, as was then contended, but
. . primarily on the fear of 'another Cuba' in Santo Domingo.''14
As an evidence of alleged overaction of the United States, it was
pointed out by Senator Morse that not even one American life "had
been lost prior to our landing the Marines."'' 0 Senator Fulbright had
earlier said that, "[N]o American lives were lost in Santo Domingo
until the Marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after April
28; reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives
turned out to be exaggerated." ' Nobody, however, denies that on
*

2 UN Monthly Chronicle 3,4 (No. 6, 1965) (Soviet representative's speech in the
Security Council).
6 Id. at 9.

145

147 111 CONG. REC. 23366 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965).
48

Id. at 23001.

49

Id. at

1
1

23002.

150 Id. at 26185. See also Bosch, The Dominican Revolution, The New Republic, July 24,
1965, reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 18130, 18131 (daily ed. July 29, 1965).
The revolution did not shoot a single person; it decapitated no one, burned
down not a single church, nor raped one woman. Nevertheless, allegations
of these horrors were proclaimed to the world at !arge. .".
President Johnson said that his Marines went into Santo Domingo to
save lives; what they really did was to destroy the democratic image of the
United States throughout the South American continent.
151 111 CONG. REc. 23001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965). See also Senator Clark's statement
to the same effect, id. at 23367-68.
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the evening of April 28, Santo Domingo was in the throes of internal
conflict, that the public order had already been disrupted and that
hundreds of foreign nationals felt unsafe and wanted to leave the
country." Moreover, a counter-argument to the contention that no
foreigner lost a life in the Dominican Republic is made that no one
53
was killed because of the swift decision to protect foreign nationals.
The first report of the Special Committee of the OAS that arrived in Santo Domingo on the morning of Sunday, May 2, is instructive. It reads, in part:
From the moment it arrived in Santo Domingo, the Special
Committee was deeply moved and saddened at the sight of this city
on a war footing. The streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses
and stores were closed, including those selling foods of prime necessity. Also closed were banks and government offices, and, in general,
the city's entire normal activity had come to a halt. Many refugees

and other persons were in asylum in the embassies of the various
American countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries personally told us that they were concerned that there were no guarantees for the premises of their respective missions. Consequently, there
was an evident lack of security and of authorities having effective
control of the situation. Public services were nonexistent, including
the most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. The atmosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish.
Rumors and other unverifiable reports were
circulated regarding
54
bloody incidents in various parts of the city.

2. Request from the Dominican Authorities
The question has been raised on the nature of the request 'by the
Dominican Military Junta for the United States Armed Forces. The
United States' official view is that the word came from the "military
officials then exercising such authority as there was in the Dominican
Republic," that they could not guarantee protection of the American
citizens. 5 The United States did not recognize the military Junta,
and did not "intervene ... on the side of the antirebel forces ... to
SZULc, DOMINIcAN DIARY 13-50 (1965).
There was firing everywhere and nobody seemed safe. As a foreign ambassador recounted later, machine-gun bullets were raining into his garden
all morning from all directions. His 5-year-old son, watching bullets from
behind a wall inside the buildings, innocently asked whether he could go
out and play with 'these things.'
id. at 52. See also KURZMAN, SANTO DOMINGO: REVOLT OF THE DAMNED 129-71
(1965). Cf. KURZMAN, id. at 171: "This is not necessarily to question the wisdom
of landing U.S. troops in some cases for the purpose of saving lives.... What can be
questioned is the relative importance of the humanitarian consideration in the decision
of the Administration to dispatch troops to Santo Domingo."
15 111 CONG. REC. 24075 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965) (statement by Rep. Selden). To the
same effect see id. at 23668-69 (statement by Ambassador Bennett).
154 First Report of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, submitted at the 4th Plenary Session
(closed) held on May 7 and 8, 1965, reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 21248 (daily ed.
Aug. 26, 1965).
155 See, e.g., note 136 supra and accompanying text; note 143 supra and accompanying

152 See generally

text.
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put down the revolt, as the United States was requested to do on
April 28 by the antirebel military junta." '
Senator Fulbright recalls the events of April 28 thus:
In midafternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of
a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in
writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to
prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta's
inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Washington, and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would
not intervene unless he said he could not protect American citizens
present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in effect
that if he said American lives were in danger the United States
would intervene. And that is precisely what happened.'57

To the same effect is Senator Clark's account of the events of the
day the American forces landed. He says:
At the instance of the CIA - I believe it can be documented - a
new junta headed by a certain Colonel Benoit had been formed, although it was pretty well confined to the San Isidro air base. That
junta sent word to Ambassador Bennett, 'You had better send American troops in because a Communist takeover threatens.'
Ambassador Bennett sent word back, 'I can't get away with
bringing Americans in on that ground because the evidence is not
dear. If you will change your request and make it in writing, and
ask American forces to intervene in order to protect American lives,
then I believe that we can persuade Washington to do it.'
So Benoit changed his position and put it on the basis of protecting American lives. Bennett forwarded that post haste to the State
Department and to the White House, and troops were sent in."5 8

Senator Morse's account is no different. In his words,
Washington - when our Ambassador was seeking to get the police
authorities to ask him to ask our Government to send in the Marines
to give so-called protection to American nationals and to evacuate
them - was not about to intervene on the public ground of a fear of
a Communist takeover, but we were ready to intervene to save American lives - not one of which had been lost prior to our landing the
Marines.
The record which was made before the Foreign Relations Committee makes that additional fact crystal clear. 1 9

In the official United States pronouncements, this charge has not
been denied. Even Undersecretary Mann, who devoted an address to
"Correcting Some Misconceptions" about the Dominican crisis, as late
60
as October 12, 1965, does not mention it.
It is possible that the United States did not attach much importance to this criticism and ignored it; apparently, the United States
reason would be that on the 28th of April, on all accounts, there was
156 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 62 (1965).

1.

CoNG. R..
c. 23.01 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).

158 Id.at

23366 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965).
Id. at 26185 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1965).
160 See Mann, The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T
59

1

BULL. 730 (1965).
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disorder in the Dominican Republic. Thus the United States' decision
to send troops could be justified on Ambassador Bennett's appraisal
of the situation and not merely on the request from the military Junta,
although the Ambassador had sent the note for the American troops"'l
only after he had received the request.
For two reasons, however, the nature of the request might be
relevant to the justification of United States claims."6 2 One, it is
widely accepted that it was the United States Ambassador who had
"visibly sponsored the creation of the Junta."' 63 This casts doubt upon
the integrity of the request. However, when this feature is coupled
with the soliciting of the request from such a sponsored government,
it casts doubt upon the declared reason for the United States' action,
that is, the protection of its nationals. Thus, the necessity of the action becomes suspect. Second, on a prior occasion the landing of the
United States forces in Beirut in 1958 was justified on the request of
the Lebanese Government. Inquiring into the legal issues involved in
the Beirut landing, a commentator had observed: "The most plausible
ground for the recent landing of military forces of the United States
near Beirut is to be found in the invitation of the . Government of
64
Lebanon .
3. Prior Consultation with OAS
One criticism of the United States' action was that it was unilateral and that the United States had not consulted the OAS members
beforehand. It had "confronted them with a fait accompli, convening
the Council of Ministers only after landing its troops in the Dominican Republic.' '165
Apparently replying to such criticism, Secretary Rusk explained
at a press conference on May 26, 1965, that the United States had
called together on April 27, a day before the United States action, the
Peace Committee of the OAS for consultation on the Dominican situation. 6' The Peace Committee did not feel itself competent to deal
with the situation. The next morning, on April 28, the United States
asked for a meeting of the OAS Council for further discussion of the
Dominican situation. The United States did not ask for any action,
For the Ambassador's note see KURZMAN, op. cit, supra note 152, at 171.
162 For a comment on the relevance of the invitation from the Lebanese Government in
1958 United States landings in Beirut, see Wright, United States Intervention in Lebaeon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112, 119 (1959).
163 SZULC, op. cit. supra note 152, at 53.
164 Potter, Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 727 (1958).
165 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 4 (No. 6, 1965) (Soviet representative's remarks in the Security Council).
166 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 938, 941 (1965).
161

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

since, as Secretary Rusk said, "[W]e ourselves did not believe that
the situation called for it."'6 7 The Secretary added, however:
Now, in retrospect, I suppose that one could say that it might have
been somewhat better for us to have insisted upon a meeting that
same evening. It might have looked better. But, in fact, when they
met the next morning, they felt that under the Charter of the OAS
the Council standing alone was not empowered to act .... [The OAS
then waited 24 hours before it took preliminary steps to meet the
situation.]

168

Ambassador Bunker said in his statement of May 3*"0 that the
United States "sent forces there in the absence of any standing OAS
force that might have been sent promptly to the Dominican Republic .

1...
70

President Johnson,' 7' Ambassador Stevenson, 7 1 and Undersecretary Ball,'7 ' among others, have also made statements to the effect
that the United States had consulted with the OAS on the Dominican
situation, but that the time factor prevented the United States from
further consulting it before sending its forces to the Dominican
Republic.
An exchange in the House of Representatives of this issue provides an interesting comparison of the two opposing viewpoints. Representative Reid of New York, said:
I am not persuaded, that it was not possible to take 5 minutes, 15
minutes, a half-hour, or even an hour to have consulted with the
OAS, and at least have informed them at the highest level of our
thinking and to consult with
them with regard to the decision that
74
we are planning to make."
To this Representative McVicker replies: "A question of which split
second should the President have called the OAS or the Latin leaders
is merely one of splitting hairs, of begging the question."' 75
C. Proportionality
The initial response of the United States was to land 400 marines.
If the United States had met the standard of necessity, and
since the protection of nearly 5,000 people was in question, this step
could not be challenged as being disproportionate to the need. The
267Id. at 942.
168 Ibid.
169 Id. at 859 (4th session of the General Committee of the Tenth Meeting).
170 Ibid.

7' Id. at 744-45 (statement of May 2d).
172Id. at 876-77 '(statement made on May 5th in Security Council). Stevenson said: "'In
this case - when hours and even minutes counted - there was no time for deliberate
consultation and for the organization of international machinery which did not yet
exist."
'73 Ball, The New Diplomacy, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1042-45 (1965).
'7' 111 CONG. RFC. 24094 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
175Id. at 24095.
176 52 DEP'T STATE BULL.

738 (1965) (President Johnson's statement).
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French representative at the United Nations had warned the United
States that while the initial United States' action was understandable
"such operations must be limited in objective, duration, and scale,
or
run the risk of becoming armed intervention, for which there appeared to be no need in this case.""'
As events turned out, after the evacuation of foreign nationals
was completed, the United States changed its objective to one of preventing "another Cuba," and continued its operation even after the
initial objective was accomplished; it further increased its armed
forces from 400 to more than 20,000.
In the Senate debate a critic of the United States' action in the
Dominican Republic, Senator Clark, explained his position thus:
My position is that when that initial intervention was multiplied by
many thousands of troops, and when the ostensible objective to protect American lives was converted by advisers of the administration
into an effort to intervene in a civil war to prevent an alleged Communist takeover, its illegality became obvious and apparent. 17 8
Similarly, Senator Morse criticized the United States' action for
not confining its scope to the "limited purpose of bringing out American nationals and evacuating them" and for involving itself in the
revolution.179
Senator Fulbright's criticism is on the same lines. He said that
the landing of a small force for the "express purpose of removing
U.S. citizens and other foreigners from the island" could be justified.18 He further said that had such a force been landed and then
promptly withdrawn when it had completed its mission, no "fairminded observer at home or abroad would have considered the United
States to have exceeded its rights and responsibilities."
President Johnson addressed himself to the question of proportionality in his statement of May 2. He said:
Our goal is a simple one. We are there to save the lives of our citizens and to save the lives of all people. Our goal, in keeping with
the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent
another Communist state in this hemisphere. And we would like to
do this without bloodshed or without large-scale fighting.18'

The objective had thus shifted: henceforth, the United States
was to justify its action not in proportion to the force needed to protect the lives of its nationals but, as the President had earlier dedared, the stakes were now "the liberty of a nation, and the prin2 UN Monthly Chronicle 7 (No. 6, 1965) (statement made at a Security Council
meeting).
178 111 CONG. REc. 23369 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965).
19 Id. at 26183 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1965).
177

180Id. at 23001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).
181 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 747 (1965).
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ciples and the values of all the American Republics.""I And in the
President's words the reason was that the revolutionary movement
had taken a tragic turn.
Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba .. .joined the
revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social
justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and
placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators. 183
In Undersecretary Mann's view the standard of proportionality
was met. He said: "All those in our Government who had full access
to official information were convinced that the landing of additional
troops was necessary in view of the clear and present danger of the
forcible seizure of power by the Communists."' ' He added that the
government had evidence indicating that at that stage the Communist
component in the revolutionary movement was stronger than the nonCommunists and that "these non-Communist elements were working
hand in glove with the Communists."'"
Statements by Ambassador Stevenson in the Security Council debate on May 5,186 and Representative Selden in the House of Representatives debate on September 23, 1965,1"7 seemed to justify the
continued presence of the United States forces in the Dominican Republic on the basis of their function in helping maintain and restore
law and order. In these statements, emphasis on the objective shifts
from the primary concern of the United States decision-makers to save
the Dominican Republic from becoming "another Cuba" to an objective related to the initial United States landing, that is, to protect lives
in general and to prevent utter chaos and anarchy which the United
States alleged might have otherwise resulted.
Selden, who makes a similar argument to the one made earlier
by Stevenson, said:
It was by no means out of proportion to the necessity. On a normal day in Santo Domingo, a police force numbering over 6,000 men
preserves the peace. Those were not 'normal' days in Santo Domingo.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that U.S. troops had several
missions to perform .... Troops in the safety zone protected that
area from continual attacks and, at the same time, conducted the

evacuation of some 5,000 people. Troops stationed in the communications corridor were charged with maintaining a safe route for evacuation and with distributing food and medical supplies to Domini182 Id. at 744.
83
1 Id.at

745.

164Mann, The Dominican Crisis: CorrectingSome Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL.
730, 736 (1965).
185 Ibid.
18652 DEP'T STATE BULL. 878 (1965).
187 111 CONG. REc. 24076 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
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cans of both factions. Moreover, these troops acted as a de facto

buffer zone subject to frequent sniper fire and direct attack. 1'
However, in the official United States announcements, proportionality of the United States action is often justified by reference to
a combination of objectives - to prevent a Communist takeover, to
give the OAS a chance to assume responsibility, to give the Dominican people an opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination, etc. The State Department Memorandum," 9 as well as statements
by Meeker'9" and Bunker.9 for example, would point to this conclusion.
D. Appraisal
The Dominican situation on the eve of the landing of the United
States troops on April 28, was, on all accounts, tense, grave, and unpredictable. Hence, notwithstanding the criticism of the United
States action to the effect that
while a few shots may have been heard in the vicinity of the American Embassy in Santo Domingo, embassies, as well as other U.S. installations, have in some countries been burned to the ground by
rampaging mobs. But Washington did not send in marines in those
cases to save American lives, or even seriously consider doing
so.192

The initial landing of four hundred Marines should be considered a
permissible self-defense measure to protect the United States nationals.
This action would be permissible even if the charge was true
that the United States authorities had solicited the request from the
military junta.'93 This would be so even if one agreed with an observation made by Senator Morse that "The failure to inform the
OAS of U.S. intervention before it was underway was an insensitive
oversight ...."I"
Finally, this action would be permissible notwithstanding a recent observation by Professor Quincy Wright that,
While civil strife may result in barbarities which 'shock the
conscience of mankind' and may, therefore, present humanitarian
aspects which have in the past been utilized as justification for intervention, it would seem that at the present time remedial measures
involving intervention belong, not to states individually, but to the
188Ibid.

at 10733 (daily ed. May 20, 1965).
190 Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective ot InternationalLaw, 53 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 60, 64 (1965): "Without our presence, it is quite possible the Dominican
Republic could have been thrown into another 30 years of darkness."
191See, e.g., his statements at the Tenth Meeting, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 739 (1965)
Id. at 854, 856-57, 859-62 (1965).
192 KURZMAN, op. cit. supra note 152, at 171.
193 See notes 155-60 supra and the accompanying text.
19 111 CONG. REc. 11276 '(1965). See also notes 166 to 175 supra and the accompanying
text.
189 Id.
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United Nations, in pursuance of its responsibilities concerning hu95
man rights.

If this action were limited in scope and duration and if the primary United States' objective had not altered later, the United States'
use of coercive measures would have met the requirement of proportionality as well, and thus would be considered permissible. Even the
staunch critics of the United States' policy in the Dominican Republic tend to agree with this conclusion. Senator Fulbright, for example, has said that, "If the United States had really been intervening
to save American lives, as it had a moral if not strictly legal right to
do, it could have done so promptly and then withdrawn and the incident would soon have been forgotten."'9 6
Senator Clark would consider the initial United States' action
justified "on humanitarian grounds."'9 1 He believed that the United
States was "under an obligation, despite ... treaty obligations to the
contrary, to send in a small force to protect American lives. '
Senator Morse would go even a step further; he considered the
initial landing of the Marines justifiable not only under moral and
humanitarian grounds but under international law as well. He would
have restricted its scope to evacuating Americans and other foreign nationals, and not to involving itself in the revolution. 99
However, the United States' action was not limited in its objective of protecting the lives of its nationals; furthermore, it was not
limited in its scope or duration either. Hence, there are serious doubts
that it met the required criterion of proportionality to justify the
United States' claim that since it had dispatched armed forces primarily to protect its citizens, the United States' use of coercive measures in the Dominican Republic should be considered a permissible
use of self-defense. Whether the action can be considered justified on
other grounds, for example, in furtherance of its treaty commitments
under the OAS Charter, will be studied later."'
IV.

CLAIM BASED ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Several United States officials stressed the "humanitarian" aspects of the Dominican conflict to justify the United States' use of
coercive measures. To illustrate, Ambassador Bunker stated in his
address before the Tenth Meeting of Consultation on May 1, 1965:
"United States forces were dispatched purely and solely for humani1'5

Wright, InternationalLaw and Civil Strife, 1959 Proceedings A.S.I.L. 145, at 152.

196 111 CONG. REc. 23001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965);
197 Id.

at 23369.

1981d. at 23365.
19 Id. at 26183.
20 0
The author will examine this claim in part two of this article.
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tarian purposes, for the protection of the lives not only of the United
States citizens but the lives of citizens of other countries as well." '
In an address two days later, he read the message addressed to
President Johnson from the Papal Nuncio who had expressed his personal gratitude "for the humane contribution and for the protection
of the foreign embassies as well as for the contribution to a ceasefire and the saving of human lives .... "'
Several other statements, such as by President Johnson,"° Ambassador Bunker,"0' Secretary Rusk,'0 5 and members of the Congress,"
refer to the "humanitarian" objective of the United States' action,
that is, that the United States' action was taken not only to protect
the United States' nationals but also nationals of other countries.
A. Past Trends
1. A Relatively Obsolete Doctrine
Most jurists writing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
described "humanitarian intervention"' as a permissible exercise of
a state's right to use coercive measures on the territory of another
state."0 8 The wide acceptance of this theory rested on the assumption
that a state must guarantee certain minimum basic rights to the people
within its territory and hence within its sphere of competence; if these
rights were denied, any other state could intervene to remedy the situation and protect their fundamental rights.
It was, however, equally well accepted that the use of force for
humanitarian intervention could be justified only "in extreme cases
.. . where great evils existed, great crimes were being perpetrated,
or where there was danger of race extermination," 2" only when "some
extraordinary state of things is brought about by the crime of a gov20152 DEP'T STATE BULL.

854 (1965). (Emphasis added.)

202 Id. at 857.
203

Id. at 742 (President Johnson's statement of April 30).

204 Id. at
205
2

861 (Bunker's statement of May 4).
Id. at 842-43 (statement by Rusk at an interview with AP).

°'See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 26183 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965) '(statement by Senator
Morse) ; Id. at 24077 (statement by Representative Selden).
7 STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES IN CONFORMITY
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defines "humanitarian intervention" as "the

justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state
from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which
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ernment against its subjects,""21 and only on the assumption that "international law forbids the conduct of rulers to their subjects, and of
parties in a state towards each other, which such interventions are intended to repress.''211 The alleged right of "humanitarian intervention" had at most a nebulous content."' It could 'be claimed on what
213
Hall called "real or pretended grounds of humanity and religion,
including "tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres and brutality in a civil war, or religious persecution.... ,,214 Moreover, since the alleged right could be exercised only
by powerful states, and could be easily forwarded by them as a justification of other political objectives, it has not been taken seriously in
modern times; rarely has it been asserted in state practices or publicists' writings.2 1 1 Professor McDougal dismisses "humanitarian intervention" as a "relatively obsolete" doctrine.2 " However, Sir Hersh
Lauterpacht supports it.21 Also, a notable exception indicative of
state practice asserting this right is the 1964 Stanleyville operation by
2 8
the United States and BelgiumY.
A brief discussion of the Stanleyville operation should be helpful to put the Dominican situation in a
proper perspective.
B. The Stanleyville Operations
The November 24, 1964, operation consisted of the United
States aircraft transporting Belgian paracommandos who were parachuted into the Stanleyville area. The United Kingdom Government
210

WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 44 (5th

ed. rev.
1879).
211 HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (4th ed. 1895). See generally id. at 302-04.
212 See, e.g., WILSON & TUCKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (9th ed. 1935).
213 HALL, op. cit. supra note 211, at 302.
214 Ibid. See also DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
172-73 (Corbett transl. 1957).
215 BROWNLIE, op. cit. supra note 208, at 340: "The state practice justifies the conclusion
that no genuine case of humanitarian intervention has occurred, with the possible exception of the occupation of Syria in 1860 and 1861. With the embarrassing exception
provided by Germany, the institution has disappeared from modern state practice."
21
6 McDoUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 90 (1961):

"For nationals of the belligerent, the common assumption is that international law offers no protection, other than in relatively obsolete doctrines of humanitarian intervention." Id. at 536: "amorphus doctrines on 'humanitarian intervention'.
217 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (Lauterpacht ed. 1955):
There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial
supremacy, a State can treat its own nationals according to discretion. But
there is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of the view
that there are limits to that discretion and that when a State renders itself
guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in such a way as to
deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind,
intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible.
Sec also i GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 289-90 (1953).
218 BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1958), also mentions the claims
by the Arab States and Israel on racial grounds to protect the Arabs and "the Jewish
population, traffic and economic life" respectively in geographical areas beyond their
territorial competence.
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had assisted the operation "for humanitarian reasons 219 by authorizing the use of their air base on Ascension Island. The operation lasted
four days and evacuated foreign nationals from Stanleyville and
Paulis.2, 0
A statement issued by the United States State Department on
November 24, 1964, explained the purpose of the action: "The immediate mission is the rescue of innocent civilians and the evacuation
of those who wish to leave the area. When this mission is accomplished, the rescue force will be withdrawn promptly.'"'"' Similarly,
another State Department statement of November 28 said: "the
United States participated in the rescue mission to Stanleyville and
Paulis for purely humanitarian reasons and with the authorization of
the Government of the Congo. ' 222 As a further justification for the
United States' action the statement added:
The mission was undertaken only because the rebels had left
open no other way to save the lives of innocent civilians of at least
18 nationalities, many of whom had been held hostage by the rebels
in direct violations223 of the Geneva Conventions and accepted humanitarian principles.
Thus the United States State Department was justifying the United
States' action on the grounds of:
1) a specific limited purpose;
2) authorization by the Congolese Government;
3) limited duration of the mission;
4) limited use of coercive measures - only one battalion of
paracommandos was transported; and
5) lack of any other recourse.
The United States-Belgium action was severely criticized by several African states in the Security Council which held seventeen
meetings on the subject. Twenty-two member states requesting the
Security Council to consider the situation had complained that the
action had "constituted an intervention in African affairs, a flagrant
violation of the [United Nations] Charter and a threat to the peace
' 2 24
and security of the African continent.
The Security Council debates show that the major criticism of the
United States-Belgian action came from the African states and the
Soviet bloc and was based on four major grounds. These grounds
were:
1) Purpose of the action - The charge was made that the action
219

1UN Monthly Chronicle 9 (No. 7, 1964).
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which "had taken place in coordination with the fighting at
and around Stanleyville," had "a military significance,' '115 and
was merely a "pretext,"" a "crude subterfuge,""2 7 to "impose
upon the people of the Congo the disputed authority of the
Tshombe Government.'"'m
2) Authorization by the Congolese regime - It was said that
"the threadbare screen of the legality of the Tshombe regime was nothing but a pretext to justify the new intervention of the NATO powers in the Congo."229
3) Violation of the United Nations Charter - The United
States, Belgium and the United Kingdom were accused of
having violated the Charter prohibition on intervention in
the internal affairs of the member states;230 furthermore,
they were accused of violating Article 52 of the Charter by
challenging the competence of the O.A.U. 2'
4) Violation of the United Nations Resolutions - The action had violated the General Assembly Declaration on Independence, 2 and the prior "United Nations resolutions
calling for the withdrawal of all forces of the former colonial
power and of foreign mercenaries and the non-interference
of all powers in the internal affairs of the Congo.' ' 2
The Belgian-American contention was that the urgency of the
situation demanded the use of coercive measures by these states and
that these measures were proportionate to their limited objective of
saving innocent civilians whose lives were otherwise endangered "by
rebel activity in violation of international law.""2 4 In answering the
criticism of their action, the United States and the Belgian representatives at the United Nations, supported by representatives from the
Id. at 19 (Czechoslovakian delegate's remarks in the Security Council debate).
Id. at 7 (statement of the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville)) ; Id. at 18 (statement of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania).
227 Id. at 9-10 (statement of the representative of Mali).
228 id. at 18 (statement of the representative of the Republic of Tanzania).
225
226

29 Id. at 19 (Soviet delegate's remarks).
230 See, e.g., id. at 19 (statement by U.S.S.R. representative) ; Id. at 19-20 (statement by

Czechoslovakian representative) ; Id. at 16-17 (statement by Burundi representative).
231 See the African states' memorandum requesting the Security Council meeting, U.N.

Doc. No. S/6076 '(1965).
(remarks of the representative of
Czechoslovakia).
23
3 Id. at 19.
234 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6068 (1965) ; see 51 DE'T STATE BULL. 845 (1964) for a letter
from the United States representative to the President of the Security Council. For the
Belgian representative's statement, see 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 11 (No. 1, 1965).
For the Congolese representative's statement, see id. at 12. For Ambassador Stevenson's
statement in the Security Council, see 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 15 (1965). See also id.
at 18 (Stevenson deals with the urgency of the situation).
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United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, France, China, Brazil and Bolivia,
put forward the following major arguments:
1) Since several foreign nationals had already been killed before the rescue operation began, 5 and others taken as hostages and threatened,238 the danger was real and urgency
great.
2) The United Nations, Organization of African Unity, and the
International Red Cross had all been repeatedly approached
to help relieve the situation but had failed to provide any
assistance because of the intransigence of the rebels;" thus
these states had exhausted every other means before resorting to their "emergency rescue mission." '38
3) The object of the operation was "solely one of saving
' and
lives,"239
the troops involved were withdrawn immediately after the objective had been achieved.24
4) The action was "justified by its objectives: to frustrate the
perpetration of a crime under international law - the use
of innocent civilians as hostages, as a bargaining point in
241
wartime."
5) The legitimate government of the Congo had authorized the
2
operation. 1
It is noteworthy that the Security Council resolution adopted on
December 30, 1964, 2" does not mention the operation at all; it merely
reiterates its prior request that all states should "refrain or desist from
intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo."
C. Validity of the United States' Claim
The preceding discussion on "humanitarian intervention" does
not give the decision-makers adequate guidelines to determine the
permissibility of the United States claim to use coercive measures in
the Dominican Republic on humanitarian grounds. The United Nations and OAS Charters, and the Council resolution after the Stan25 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 10 (No.

1, 1965)

(Ambassador Stevenson's statements

in the Security Council).
236
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See, e.g., id. at 14 (United Kingdom representative's statement) ; Id. at 16 (French
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240 See, e.g., id. at 14 (United Kingdom representative's statement).
241 Id. at 17 (Brazilian representative's statement). See also id. at 20 (Norwegian representative's statement).
242 See, e.g., id. at 16 (French representative's statement) ; Id. at 17 (Brazilian representative's statement) ; Id. at 18 (Chinese representative's statement) ; Id. at 20 (Bolivian
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leyville debate do not prohibit such action, nor do they specifically
permit it. The choice, however, is not between the two conflicting
statements, each one asserted to be the rule:
1) that whatever is not specifically prohibited under international law is permitted, and
2) that whatever is not specifically authorized under international law is prohibited.*
The blanket application of either one of the approaches suggested in
these statements to every situation does not provide a meaningful
answer. Both of these approaches are rigid and doctrinaire and are
unrelated to the context of a situation. Perhaps the best approach is
to test the permissibility of a state's action to use coercive measures
by the related criteria of necessity and proportionality.
Before testing the United States' claim by these standards a few
major distinguishing features between the claim in the Dominican
situation and the one in the Stanleyville operation should be noted.
They are:
1) While the objective in the Stanleyville operation was clearly
limited to humanitarian purposes 4 it was not so in the Dominican situation. 4 7
2) While the Tshombe Government was the legitimate government of the Congo 248 (although some African states questioned it)2 48 the military Junta was not so25 and therefore
could not speak for the Dominican people.
3) While prior consultations between Belgian authorities and
international organizations in the Stanleyville case"s' had left
no alternative for Belgium but to resort to coercive measures,
the lack of prior consultations with the OAS was a major
criticism of the United States' action in the Dominican
Republic." 2
The distinguishing features between the two situations notwithstanding, the prior discussion on the validity of the United States
claim to use force for protecting its nationals is equally applicable
See case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (discussion of these
statements).
248 See note 238 supra.
247 See notes 178-85, 196-200 supra and accompanying text.
248 See note 242 supra and accompanying text.
249 Cf. 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 16 (No. 1, Jan. 1965) (Nigerian representative's statement).
250 See notes 155-64 supra and accompanying text.
251 See 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 11 (No. 1, 1965) (Belgian representative's statement) ; Id. at 12 (Congolese representative's statement).
252 See notes 166-75 supra and accompanying text.
245
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here"3 - while the necessity of the action can be defended on humanitarian grounds, the proportionality cannot be justified. The question
of the permissibility of the action on some other grounds" will be
examined in a later article.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Many arguments justifying or criticizing the United States' action
in the Dominican Republic hinge on the observer's perception of what
the asserted or assumed facts and events are. Thus, in the Dominican
situation or any other similar situation, the criteria of necessity and
proportionality to determine permissibility of the use of coercive
measures will have a meaningful reference only if the "facts" are
known. Therefore, it is imperative that independent fact-finding
bodies on regional and international levels be established. It is suggested that as a preliminary step, regional organizations such as the
OAS should set up a permanent fact-finding organ with its representatives stationed in the capital of each member state. The mechanics
of setting up such an operation should not pose too much of a problem. It is realized that this suggestion involves the risk of a major
power in a regional organization exercising a preponderance of influence and control in such an agency, and thus the reported "facts"
may be colored; however, as a first step, it is still preferable to the
present situation wherein a state assumes the competence of unilaterally defining the character of a situation and subsequently justifying
its response by reference to the character so defined. It is further
realized that this suggestion will not automatically resolve all problems of factual determination. However, the installation of such machinery will provide better chances for a more fair and objective
determination of "facts" and events.
Second, regional and international tribunals should review the
initial use of coercive measures by a state. The fact-finding bodies
could provide first-hand information to these tribunals. Community
review in the political forums is undoubtedly valuable, but a legal
adjudication of a state's asserted right by a regional or international
tribunal will have an additional advantage of providing a forum
where judicial treatment and reasoning will supplant political tirades
and polemics.
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